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00100 .SEC THE PARANOID MODE
00200 .SS The Concept of Paranoia
00300 Like ourselves, the ancient Greeks called one another
00400 paranoid. The term `paranoia' (Gr.:para=beside; nous = mind) was a
00500 lay rather than a medical term which referred to states of craziness
00600 and mental deterioration. For two thousand years the term did not
00700 appear in the classification schemes of mental disorders. [Menninger
00800 et al.] Historians do not seem curious about what persons with
00900 persecutory delusions were called all that time. (It is doubtful that
01000 there weren't any.) In the 18th century the term reappears in German
01100 classifications to refer to delusional states which were considered
01200 disorders of intellect rather than emotion. [Lewis ].
01300 Little agreement about the term's usuage was reached until
01400 the present time when it has achieved adjectival status as in
01500 "paranoid personality" and "paranoid state". Currently the term is
01600 used to refer to the presence of delusions (false beliefs). Some
01700 users refer to any sort of delusion as indicative of paranoia but the
01800 primary usage restricts the term to persecutory delusions. Somatic,
01900 erotic, grandeur and jealousy delusions are often simply identified
02000 as such without calling them paranoid.
02100
02200 .SS Characteristics of Clinical Paranoias
02300 In dividing the world of experience into conceptual classes ,
02400 we also sort and group objects and events together according to
02500 properties they have in common. The members of a class resemble one
02600 another in sharing certain properties. The resemblance between
02700 members of a class is not exact or total. Members of a conceptual
02800 class are considered more or less alike and there exist degrees of
02900 resemblance. Humans are neither subjective nor objective, they are
03000 projective. In forming classifications we project our interests and
03100 intentions onto the world. Thus the world of experience consists of
03200 relations, not of objects isolated from human intentions.
03300 Observations and classifications made by clinicians regarding
03400 paranoia have been thoroughly described in the psychiatric
03500 literature. Extensive accounts can be found in Swanson, Bohnert and
03600 Smith (1970) and in Cameron (1967). I shall attempt to give a
03700 condensed description of paranoid phenomena as they appear in, or are
03800 described by, patients in a psychiatric interview.
03900
04000 The phenomena the model attempts to explain can be described
04100 under concepts of suspiciousness, self-reference, hypersensitivity,
04200 fearfulness , hostility and rigidity - these properties representing
04300 empirical indicators of paranoia.
04400
04500 .F Suspiciousness
04600 The main characteristic of the clinical paranoid mode
04700 consists of suspiciousness of others which derives from the patient's
04800 malevolence beliefs. The patient believes others, known and
04900 unknown, have evil intentions towards him. He is continously on the
05000 look-out for signs of malevolence which he often reads from his own
05100 probings. He is hypervigilant; people must be watched, their schemes
05200 unmasked and foiled. He is convinced others try to bring about
05300 undesirable states in himself such as humiliation, harassment,
05400 subjugation, injury and even death. In an interview he may report
05500 such beliefs directly or ,if he is guarded , they will only be hinted
05600 at. He does not confide easily. Disclosure may depend upon how the
05700 interviewer responds in the dialogue to reports of fluctuating
05800 suspicions or of absolute convictions of malevolence.
05900 He is greatly concerned with "evidence". No room is allowed
06000 for mistakes, ambiguities or chance happenings. "Paranoids have a
06100 greater passion for the truth than other madmen " -(Bellow in
06200 Sammler's Planet). Using trivial evidential details, he leaps from
06300 the undeniable to the unbelievable.
06400 The patient may vary in his own estimate of the strength of
06500 his malevolence beliefs. If they consist of weakly-held suspicions,
06600 he may have moments of reasoning with himself in which he tries to
06700 reject them as ill-founded. But when the beliefs represent absolute
06800 convictions, he does not struggle to dismiss them. They become
06900 pre-conditions for countering actions against tormentors who wish and
07000 try to do him evil. He seeks affirmation of his beliefs, sympathy ,
07100 and allies in positions of power such as clinicians or lawyers who
07200 can help him take action. "It is certain that my conviction increases
07300 the moment another soul will believe in it." -(Conrad in Lord Jim).
07400 The conceptual content of the malevolence beliefs may involve
07500 a specific other person or a conspiracy of others such as the Mafia,
07600 the FBI, Communists, Hell's Angels. The patient sees himself as a
07700 victim ,one who suffers at the hands of others rather than as an
07800 agent who brings the suffering on himself. Other agents subject him
07900 to and make him the object of their evil intentions. He dwells on and
08000 rehearses in his mind these outrages. He schemes to defeat or escape
08100 his adversaries. The misdeeds of others are denounced, desparaged,
08200 condemned and belittled. He feels interfered with and discriminated
08300 against. At times the conceptual content of the beliefs are not
08400 directly expressed in an interview. The patient may be so
08500 mistrustful of how their disclosure might be used against him that he
08600 cautiously feels his way through an interview offering only hints
08700 which the clinician then uses to infer the presence of delusions.
08800
08900 A clinician faces the task of distinguishing whether the
09000 malevolence beliefs are true, false or pretense. Some malevolence
09100 beliefs may turn out to be true. Others are true but have derived
09200 from the paranoid's tendency to accuse and provoke others to the
09300 point where they in fact display hostility towards him.
09400
09500
09600 .F Self-Reference and Hypersensitivity
09700
09800
09900 The patient believes many more events in the world pertain to
10000 himself in a negative way than seems justified to other observers.
10100 For example, he is convinced that newspaper headlines are directed
10200 personally at him or that the statements of radio announcers contain
10300 special messages for him. In his hypervigilance he hypersensitively
10400 reads himself into situations which are not actually intended to
10500 pertain to him and his particular concerns. The references to
10600 the self are usually interpreted as malevolent conceptually. He may
10700 believe he is being observed and mysteriously influenced by others
10800 with evil intentions. He is excessively concerned about eyes (which
10900 can both watch and punish), cameras, telescopes ,etc. which may be
11000 directed his way.
11100
11200 References to the self are misconstrued as slurs, slights or
11300 unfair judgements. He may feel he is being watched, stared at and
11400 even mysteriously influenced. He is hypersensitive to criticism. In
11500 crowds he believes he is intentionally bumped and on the highway he
11600 feels repeatedly tail-gaited. Badgered and bombarded without relief
11700 by this stream of wrongs , he becomes hyperirritable, querulous and
11800 guarrelsome.
11900 He is touchy about certain topics, flaring up when linguistic
12000 representations of particular conceptual domains appear in the
12100 conversation. For example, any remarks about his age, religion, or
12200 family, or sexlife may set him off. Even when these domains are
12300 touched upon without reference to him, e.g. religion in general, he
12400 takes it personally. When a delusional complex is present,
12500 linguistic terms far removed but still connectable to the complex,
12600 stir him up. Thus for a man holding beliefs that the Mafia intend to
12700 harm him, a remark about Italy might cause him to react in a
12800 suspicious or fearful manner.
12900
13000 .F Affect-States
13100
13200 The major affects expressed, both verbally and nonverbally,
13300 are those of fear and anger. The patient may be fearful of physical
13400 attack and injury even to the point of death. He fears others wish
13500 to subjugate and control him. His fear is justified in his mind by
13600 the many physical threats he detects in the conduct of others towards
13700 him. He is hostile to what are interpreted as insinuations or
13800 demeaning allusions. His chronic irritability becomes punctuated with
13900 outbursts of raging tirades and diatribes. When he feels he is being
14000 overwhelmed he may erupt and in desperation physically attack others.
14100 The experienced and expressed affects of fear and anger blend
14200 with one another in varying proportions to yield an unpleasant
14300 negative affect state made continuous by fantasied rehearsals and
14400 retellings of past wrongs. Depending on his interpretation of
14500 malevolent input, the patient may move away from others in being
14600 guarded, secretive and evasive and then may suddenly jump at others
14700 with sarcastic accusations and arguments. His affect-states
14800 become chained into loops with those others in his life space who
14900 take censoring action towards him because of his uncommunicativeness
15000 or outbursts.
15100
15200 As will be described, the affects of shame and humiliation
15300 are postulated to play a crucial role in the operations of the
15400 paranoid mode. One of the assumptions of the theory to be
15500 presented involves a principle of escaping humiliation to prevent a
15600 further reduction in self-esteem through re-experienced humiliation.
15700
15800 .F Rigidity
15900
16000 Among the chief properties of clinically observed paranoia
16100 are those phenomena which may be characterized as indicators of
16200 rigidity. The patient's beliefs in his sensitive areas remain fixed,
16300 difficult to influence by evidence or persuasion. The patient
16400 himself makes few verification attempts which might disconfirm his
16500 convictions. To change a belief is to admit being wrong. To
16600 forgive others also opens a crack in the wall of righteousness. He
16700 does not apologize nor accept apology. He stubbornly follows rules
16800 to the letter and his literal interpretations of regulations can
16900 drive others wild. It is this stance or posture of rigidity and
17000 inflexibility which makes the treatment of paranoia by
17100 symbolic-semantic methods so difficult.
17200
17300 .SS Theories of Paranoia
17400
17500 While paranoid processes represent a disorder from one
17600 standpoint, the observable regularities of the disorder imply an
17700 underlying nonrandom "pathological" order at another level.
17800 Attempts to explain, to make intelligible, the order behind the
17900 disorder, have been offered since antiquity. None of these
18000 verbally-stated formulations have won the consensus characteristic of
18100 scientific theories since they were neither systematic nor testable.
18300 Science represents a search for consensible knowledge,
18400 judgements about which agreement can be obtained. Consensus is
18500 reached when a theory fulfills requirements of systemicity and
18600 testability.
18700 For a theory to be systematic, its hypotheses must cohere,
18800 not be isolated, connect with one another and collaborate in a
18900 consistent way. Each hypothesis stands as an initial assumption or as
19000 a consequence of one or more initial assumptions. The consequence
19100 relation can be one of logical or empirical entailment but the
19200 system, to be consistent, cannot contain contradictions.
19300 For a theory to be testable, it must be sensitive to
19400 empirical data which can strenghten or weaken its acceptability. Each
19500 hypothesis in the theory need not be directly or independently
19600 testable. But the theory as a conjunction of hypotheses must be
19700 brought into contact with data of observation, if not directly, then
19800 indirectly, through a translation in which a consequence of the
19900 theory can be compared with observational evidence.
20000 Previous theories of paranoia are to be criticized for not
20100 satisfying these requirements of systemicity and testability. The
20200 model to be presented fulfills these requirements. When theories are
20300 presented in literary form it is difficult to know what such
20400 formulations imply or whether the implications are consistent. They
20500 do not tell us what we are supposed to do in order to replicate the
20600 experience of their authors. If a formulation is untestable, the
20700 issues it raises are undecidable and unsettleable and consensus
20800 cannot be reached.
20900
21000 Theories stem from two sources, from hypotheses suggested by
21100 new descriptions of the phenomena themselves and from modifications
21200 of a legacy of previous theories (bequeathed myths of the field).
21300 Each generation develops new explanatory theories by discovering new
21400 phenomena or by modifying predecessor theories. The old theories are
21500 unsatisfactory or only partially satisfactory because they are found
21600 to contain anomalies or contradictions which must be removed.
21700 Sometimes previous theories are viewed as lacking evidential support
21800 by current standards. Theories are mainly superseded rather than
21900 disproved. The new versions try to remove the contradictions and
22000 increase comprehensiveness by explaining more phenomena.
22100 Theories have many functions. They can be summarized as
22200 follows [from Bunge?] .V
22300 (1)To systematize knowledge.
22400 (2)To explain facts by showing how they are the entailed
22500 consequences of the systematizing hypotheses.
22600 (3)To increase knowledge by deriving new facts.
22700 (4)To enhance the testability of hypotheses by connecting
22800 them to observations.
22900 (5)To guide research by:
23000 (a) posing fruitful problems
23100 (b) suggesting new data to gather
23200 (c) opening new lines of investigation
23300 (6)To map a portion of reality. .END
23400 It is a tall order for a theory to fulfill all of these
23500 functions. In undeveloped fields we should be happy with even one of
23600 them. Models can be assigned these functions when they are
23700 theoretical in type. Our model was intended primarily to serve
23800 functions (2) and (4), testable explanation.
23900 Theories offered as scientific explanations should be (a)
24000 systematic (i.e. coherent and consistent) and (b) empirically
24100 testable. Prior psychological formulations about the paranoid mode do
24200 not meet these criteria and thus deserve to be bygone notions. For
24300 example, to account for paranoid thought process by citing an
24400 imbalance of intellect and affect or defective role-taking is to be
24500 so global and untestable as to not merit theory status. To gain
24600 consensus with an explanation of the right type we need a structure
24700 of symbol-manipulating processes, strategies, functions or procedures
24800 which is capable of producing the observable regularities of the
24900 paranoid mode.
25000 In psychiatry it is still useful to view some things which
25100 happen to a man in mechanical terms. But a man is not only a passive
25200 recipient, subject to Newtons's laws, he is also an active agent, a
25300 language user who thereby can monitor himself, control himself,
25400 direct himself, comment on and criticize these performances. Modern
25500 psychiatric theory should try to offer an account of man as agent as
25600 well as recipient and come to grips with those enigmatic cases in
25700 which what happens to a man can be a consequence of what he has done.
25800 Let us consider some psychological explanations for the
25900 paranoid mode beginning in the late 19th century. (Historians can
26000 certainly find notions of intentions, affects and beliefs as far back
26100 as Aristotle, who seldom quoted his sources. "Its all been said
26200 before but you have to say it again because nobody listens"(Gide)).
26300 In 1896 Freud [ ] proposed a formulation which postulated a defensive
26400 strategy or procedure to explain persecutory paranoia . He assumed
26500 the believed persecution of the self by others to represent projected
26600 self-reproaches for childhood masturbation. Today hardly anyone
26700 finds this explanation plausible. While it has withered, however,
26800 the concepts of defense and projection have weathered the years.
26900 Around the turn of the century, Fliess (according to Jones[
27000 ]) proposed in letters to Freud that paranoid thought stemmed from an
27100 unconscious homosexual conflict. Freud embraced this idea
27200 whole-heartedly and in 1910 [ ] developed it in terms of
27300 transformations being applied to the basic proposition `I (a man)
27400 love him.' He postulated this proposition to be so intolerable as not
27500 to be admitted to consciousness and therefore subjected to
27600 unconscious transformations, first into `I do not love him, I hate
27700 him' which in turn was transformed into the conscious belief `He
27800 hates me' with the accompanying conclusion `Therefore I am justified
27900 in hating him'. Great difficulty has been encountered in testing the
28000 theory since there is no agreed-on method for detecting the presence
28100 of unconscious homosexual conflict. The explanation is also
28200 inconsistent with another of Freud's ideas that everyone harbors
28300 unconscious homosexual conflicts. But not everyone becomes paranoid.
28400 To reconcile the inconsistency one would have to postulate some
28500 additional, possibly quantitative factors, to explain the intensity
28600 and extent of the paranoid mode in certain people. Another
28700 difficulty is the fact that overtly homosexual people can be
28800 paranoid, requiring in such cases a postulate of some other type of
28900 underlying conflict.
29000 Because of its inconsistency and untestability the
29100 homosexual-conflict explanation has not achieved consensus. But as
29200 will be discussed, it may contain a grain of truth as a limiting case
29300 for a more general hypotheses regarding humiliation in the paranoid
29400 mode. Freud's later attempts at the explanation of paranoia (In Ego
29500 and Id) assumed simply that love was transformed into hate. This
29600 notion is too vague and incomplete an articulation to qualify for a
29700 contemporary explanation which reqires a more precisely defined
29800 organization of functions to account for such a transformation.
29900 Cameron's explanation [1967] of "projected hostilty"
30000 represents a single, isolated hypothesis and thus does not qualify as
30100 an adequate explanation on grounds of systemicity.
30200 Tomkins [ ] in 196? offered an arresting
30300 information-processing theory of the paranoid posture articulated in
30400 terms of defensive strategies, transformations ,and
30500 maximizing-minimizing principles. He viewed the paranoid mode as an
30600 attempt to cope with humiliation. He proposed that a person whose
30700 information processing is monopolized by the paranoid mode is in a
30800 permanent state of vigilance, trying to maximize the detection of
30900 insult and to minimize humiliation.
31000 Regarding the paranoid, Tomkins stated:
31100 .V
31200 "The major source of distortion in his interpretation is
31300 in his insistence on processing all information as though
31400 it were relevant only to the possibility of humiliation."
31500 .END
31600 In 1970 Swanson et al.[ ] in a book on paranoia portrayed how
31700 a `homeostatic' individual attempts to deal with `bewildering
31800 perceptions'. They postulated that a person in homeostatic
31900 equilibrium perceives a pronounced inner or outer change which is
32000 inexplicable or unacceptable. The resultant disequilibrium is so
32100 bewildering that in order to restore equilibrium, the person
32200 constructs a paranoid explanation which attributes the cause of the
32300 change, not to the self, but to an external source. With the cause
32400 of the change identified , bewilderment is abolished and uncertainty
32500 reduced.
32600 Elements of this formulation represent symbol-processing
32700 strategies particularly in cases of paranoid thinkng associated with
32800 the `pronounced changes' of organic brain damage or amphetamine
32900 psychosis. These are conditions which happen to a man. In paranoid
33000 states, reactions or personalities where no pronounced physical
33100 change can be identified ,the formulation is inadequate and must be
33200 filled out with more specific transformations.
33300 In sum, the rival theories of paranoia here reviewed have not
33400 gained widespread acceptance because of various weaknesses and
33500 limitations. No reigning and unified theory of paranoia is widely
33600 accepted today. In such a pre-consensus state the field is wide open
33700 for contenders. I shall approach this ancient problem of paranoia in
33800 a different way, using the strategy of simulation. I shall attempt to
33900 to explain sequences of paranoid symbolic behavior (conversational
34000 interactions) by describing in some detail a simulation of paranoid
34100 interview behavior , having in mind an audience of mental health
34200 professionals and colleagues in fields of psychiatry, psychology,
34300 artificial intelligence, linguistics and philosophy. The simulation
34400 model proposed stands as a candidate explanation intended to be more
34500 explicit, systematic, consistent and testable than the theories
34600 described above. The model combines hypotheses of previous
34700 contributions (especially Tomkin's) with hypotheses and assumptions
34800 of my own into a coherent unified explanatory system. Let us next
34900 consider the nature of explanatory systems.